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Abstract
A model is introduced to analyze the eﬀect of network eﬀects
and transactions patterns on the decision by banks (not) to stan-
dardize payment systems both domestically and across borders.
If only a small share of all transactions is cross-border, banks
have strong incentives to maintain incompatible standards across
countries. The model is applied to the case of harmonizing Eu-
rope’s payment networks.
1 Introduction
Aligning Europe’s many national standards and networks is an impor-
tant challenge in the quest for a common market. Credit transfer pay-
ment systems, for example, are still national: in spite of the common
currency it is much easier to transfer money from Lille to Marseille (1000
km) than across the Belgian border to Kortrijk (30 km).1
This lack of European standardization is important because it hinders
intra-Europe commerce. It also forms a barrier against cross-border
entry of banks. A bank in country A cannot oﬀer retail products in
country B without having some form of access to the payment system
in that country: its customers will need access to their savings accounts
∗This paper resulted from a discussion at the 23rd SUERF symposium in Brussels.
Comments and suggestions by Arnout Boot, Robin Cowan, Martin Fase, Leo van
Hove, and Steven Ongena are greatfully acknowledged.
1Credit transfers comprise payments where a client instructs his bank to transfer
money to the account of someone else, not necessarily with the same bank. The
category includes direct debits, where the payee (generally a company, for example
an electrical utility) instructs his bank to take the money out of the account of the
payee.
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and they will want to transfer money from their salary accounts to pay
their bills. Such access generally requires a (substantial) local presence
with set-up costs, etc.
There is both theoretical and empirical evidence that lack of cross-
border entry reduces welfare. Hoschka (1993) provides a theoretical
model to analyze the eﬀect on cross-border entry on the domestic deposit
market, and finds that cross-border entry can (1) increase price compe-
tition, (2) reduce X-ineﬃciencies, (3) spoil collusive domestic equilibria,
and (4) increase the quality and variety of services.
Berger, DeYoung, et al. (2000) survey the empirical literature on
bank eﬃciency, and find (1) a substantial dispersion among eﬃciencies
(X-ineﬃciencies) both within and across countries, (2) a clear reduction
of X-ineﬃciencies in a country after the entry of foreign competitors.2
Cecchini (1988) quantifies the yearly benefits of full competition
among European financial service providers at 22 billion ECU.3 Sixteen
years, and many common market initiatives later, there is little doubt
that European retail banking markets remain highly local. Kleimeier and
Sandor (2003), for example, examine retail deposit and lending rates in
10 European countries, and conclude that the European market for retail
banking products remains fragmented.
This paper models payment systems as economic networks and re-
formulates the (lack of) a common payment system as a compatibility
issue. It introduces a model to analyze the compatibility decision in a
2-country setting. The model explicitly considers payment transactions
patterns. In practice, these patterns are highly national. Less than 1%
of all credit transfer payments, and about 5% of all card and cash pay-
ments are cross-border, the rest is domestic. As the overview in table
1 shows, the same is true for other networks like mail and telephony.
The analysis and model in this paper can therefore be equally applied
to other network sectors like telecommunication.
The main result of the model is that transaction patterns crucially
aﬀect the compatibility decision. With random patterns, firms always
prefer compatible standards. This result changes radically if transaction
patterns are semi-autarkic. Firms will then generally prefer incompati-
bility, even in the absence of migration costs.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes the literature
2Berger, De Young, et al. talk of X-eﬃciencies, while Hoschka prefers X-
ineﬃciencies. This paper uses the latter term.
3About 30 billion Euro in today’s money. This figure is derived by assuming that
for each financial product (loans, mortgages, savings, etc.) prices in all European
countries would migrate to those in the country with the best prices (lowest interest
rates for loans and mortgages, highest for savings).
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Category Unit Int’l traﬃc Countries included
Surface mail Letters received 1.5% Global average
Telephony Call minutes
- Fixed line 1- 1.5% US
- GSM 1.5-2% Scandinavia
Payments Transactions
- Credit transfers 0.5% EU, US, Can, Japan
- Credit/Debit cards 5% EU
- Cash 5% Euro zone
Table 1: Cross-border traﬃc as a percentage of all traﬃc.
Source: mail data from UPU (2004), fixed telephony data from FCC (2003),
Telestatistik (2000) and TeliaSonera (2003), GSM data from Telestatistik
(2000), transfer payment data from BIS (2004) and ECB (2003), card payment
data based on McKinsey analysis of Visa and MasterCard data, cash estimate
based on Euronote diﬀusion figures (analysis available from the author).
on transaction patterns and network eﬀects. Sections 3 introduces a
model to analyze the eﬀect of national patterns on the harmonization
of sponsored standards. Section 4 applies the model to the (lack of)
harmonization of European systems for making credit transfer payments.
Section 5 discusses the results.
2 Literature
There is ample evidence that standards and in particular payment sys-
tems are subject to increasing returns, where each user makes the stan-
dard or network more valuable to other (potential) users.4 Empirical
studies confirm the existence of network externalities for ATMs (Saloner
and Shepard, 1995, and Sharma, 1993), ACH-transfers (Gowrisankaran
and Stavins, 2002), and debit and credit cards (Stavins, 2001, and Man-
tel and McHugh, 2001).
A wide body of literature analyzes the adoption and compatibility of
network technologies. The literature generally makes a distinction be-
tween sponsored standards, which can be owned and controlled by firms
(e.g. video formats like VHS and Betamax), and unsponsored standards,
which are open to all (e.g. the fax protocol). Payment system standards
are generally sponsored, hence the remainder of this section will focus on
4For a recent overview of the topic, see the June 2003 issue of the Review of
Network Economics, which was entirely dedicated to network eﬀects in payment
systems.
3
the sponsored standards literature.5 Furthermore, payment systems are
mostly adopted by firms (banks) that compete monopolistically by oﬀer-
ing diﬀerentiated products. The ‘Mix & Match’ model of Matutes and
Regibeau (1988) analyzes the compatibility decision by 2 firms that oﬀer
diﬀerentiated network goods. They find that in equilibrium firms prefer
compatibility. Shy (2001) models the compatibility decision by firms
whose customers face switching costs. If one firm suﬃciently undercuts
the price of the other firm, compensating customers for switching costs,
it can lure them away from its competitors. Shy too finds that, if the
product is subject to network eﬀects, compatibility is the equilibrium
outcome.
All of these models assume random transaction patterns, where each
additional user is equally relevant to the existing customer base. As the
previous section shows, however, this is not the case for many networks.
Foreign users are generally less relevant than other users in the same
country. Relatively little attention has been devoted to the eﬀect of
such spatial transaction patterns. And the few examples that do, focus
on unsponsored standards. For example, Ellison (1993) analyses agents
located on a circle. These agents face a choice between two standards,
preferring the standard of their immediate neighbors. Given suﬃcient
local externalities, the system will converge to universal compatibility,
where all agents use the same standard. Cowan and Cowan (1998) model
agents on a lattice. These too face a choice between two standards, again
preferring the standard of their immediate neighbor. In addition to this
local positive externality, however, the authors introduce a global neg-
ative externality. This leads to coexistence of standards, where each
standard occupies an enclave or region. Both models assume homoge-
neous landscapes without borders. As a result, the enclaves of Cowan
and Cowan drift across the lattice as the model iterates. In real life,
however, the enclaves tend to be countries, which are geographically
fixed. The model of Bassanini and Dosi (1998) does explicitly consider
‘countries’. They apply a Polya urn model to an environment with mul-
tiple interacting pools of consumers, and find that diﬀerent outcomes
can occur for diﬀerent pools, in line with the observed reality of na-
tional standards. The Polya urn model, however, analyzes the adoption
of unsponsored standards. Furthermore, it focuses entirely on the ini-
tial adoption; it does not consider subsequent migration to a common
standard.
In summary, there are good models to analyze the compatibility de-
5Banks can generally control access to their networks. For example they can deny
access to their ATMs. Similarly, membership of credit and debit card networks has
been subject to fees and conditions.
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cision for sponsored standards, as long as agents interact randomly. The
eﬀect of national transaction patterns, however, remains to be explored.
The next section introduces a model to do just that.
3 The model
The basic model assumes Section 3.1 assumes random transaction pat-
terns, and in that case the model leads to similar results as other models
for monopolistic competition between two firms oﬀering diﬀerentiated
products: both firms prefer to establish compatibility in equilibrium.6
These outcomes then serve as a reference to analyze the impact of non-
random transaction patterns in section 3.2.
3.1 Basic model with random transaction patterns
Two firms, A and B, are located at either end of the unit interval and
compete à la Hotelling. Each customer buys exactly one unit of the good
from the firm that oﬀers the lowest price corrected for transportation
cost, which are equal to t per unit of distance between the customer and
the supplying firm. Without loss of generality the number of customers
is normalized to one, and marginal costs to zero. Let pi, si and πi,
i ∈ {A,B}, be the price, market share and profit of the two firms. The
equilibrium values of these parameters, denoted with an asterisk (*), can
be derived using the standard Hotelling approach. The market shares
are defined by the marginal customer who is indiﬀerent between buying
from either firm, because their net prices, corrected for transportation
costs are equal:
pi + sit = pj + (1− si)t⇔ si =
pj − pi + t
2t
. (1)
Profits are then:
πi = pisi =
pipj − p2i + pit
2t
.
The first order condition for profit maximization is:
∂πi
∂pi
=
pj − 2pi + t
2t
= 0.
6Other models are Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Shy (2001). These, however,
cannot easily deal with non-random transaction patterns.
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Since equilibrium is symmetrical, this leads to the standard Hotelling
result:
p∗= t
s∗=
1
2
(2)
π∗= t
2
.
Assume now that the goods oﬀered are subject to network benefits b
per user of the network. Without loss of generality, both the number
of consumers and unit transportation costs, t, are normalized to one (b
should be expressed as a multiple of t). Each firm oﬀers a proprietary
standard to its consumers, unless both firms decide to oﬀer each other
compatibility. If the goods of the two firms are incompatible, each good
oﬀers network benefits equal to bsi (since the number of consumers is
normalized to one). To reflect these eﬀects we can define hedonic prices
pˆi that are corrected for network benefits:
pˆi≡ pi − b if the networks of A and B are compatible (3)
pˆi≡ pi − bsi if they are not. (4)
If both networks are compatible, hedonic prices as defined in (3) can be
substituted into (1). Because the network benefits are the same for the
product of both firms (since their networks are compatible) the corre-
sponding terms ‘cancel out’, and equilibrium prices and profits are the
same as without the network eﬀect.7
If networks are incompatible we have to substitute (4) instead of (3)
into (1):
pi + bsi = pj + b(1− si)⇔ si =
pj − pi + 1− b
2(1− b) .
The system now has an internal solution iﬀ b < 1; for b > 1 the
market ‘tips’: either firm captures the whole market.8
7Since pˆ∗i ≡ p∗i − b = 1 − b, the full network benefit accrues to the consumer.
The network benefits are equal for both firms, and thus they act exactly like the
marginal costs in the original Hotelling model (but in the opposite direction): they
aﬀect consumer welfare, but not firm profits.
8This result was obtained for a wide class of diﬀerentiated network good models
by DePalma and Leruth (1993). The essence of their proof is that if b > t the
network benefits exceed the transportation costs even for the most distant customer.
All customers thus join the largest network and the system ‘tips’ to the standard
6
If b < 1 we can use the standard Hotelling approach and substitute
the above expression in the profit function (πi = pisi). By then taking
the first order condition we get the following symmetrical equilibrium:
p∗=1− b
s∗=
1
2
(5)
π∗= 1
2
− 1
2
b.
By comparing (5) with (2) it follows that prices and profits are lower
compared to the situation where both firms oﬀer compatible network
products. Following the literature we can model firm actions as a two-
stage game. In stage 1 each firm decides whether to oﬀer and accept
compatibility with the other firm. Compatibility is only established of
both firms agree. In stage 2 they compete on price. It then follows
that the unique (Nash) equilibrium outcome is that the two firms estab-
lish compatibility, because profits for both firms are always higher un-
der compatibility. This outcome also maximizes welfare. Compatibility
raises firm profits by b, while it reduces the hedonic price to consumers
by b
2
, leading to a net welfare gain of b
2
.
Result 1 With homogenous transaction patterns, two firms will
settle on compatibility, which is also the socially optimal solution.
This basic result can now be used as a benchmark for analyzing what
happens if transactions patterns are highly national (as shown by table
1).9
3.2 The eﬀect of autarkic transaction patterns
Let the above Hotelling model be adapted as follows. The unit interval
is divided into two halves (‘countries’) of equal size. If transaction pat-
of either firm: an increase in the share of a firm increases the network benefits to a
user by an amount larger than the increase in transportation cost for the marginal
consumer. Instead of an internal solution where two incompatible standards share
the market, there are now two corner solutions where either firm captures the whole
market.
9As discussed earlier, this result is in line with other models of diﬀerentiated
network goods, like those of Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Shy (2001). The
reason for not picking either of these two models, is that neither model can be
extended to deal with national transaction patterns. Matutes and Regibeau’s Mix &
Match model analyzes the combination of two components (as in hifi-equipment or
cameras and lenses). Shy’s model could be adapted to analyze two countries. There
is however no diﬀerentiation between consumers in a country: they either all stick
to the current provider, or all switch to another. Thus a situation where only some
consumers use a foreign standard never occurs.
7
terns were random, each customer would perform half of his transactions
(payments, phone calls etc.) with other customers in his own country
(i.e. his own half of the unit interval), and the other half of his trans-
actions with customers in the other country. Assume instead that the
two halves are somewhat autarkic: customers on each half of the interval
transact mostly within their own half of the unit interval. Consider, for
example, consumers of Elzas-Lorraine. They could well be somewhere
between France and Germany in ‘taste-space’; yet most of their trans-
actions will be within France (paying Gaz de France, France Telecom,
taxes, etc.). Assume that instead of half their transactions, consumers
perform only a fraction δ
2
of their transactions with consumers in the
other ‘country’, and a fraction 1− δ
2
with consumers in their own coun-
try. Here δ = 1 corresponds to random interaction, and δ = 0 represents
complete autarky (i.e. consumers transact only with consumers on their
own side of the interval).
If δ < 1, the equilibrium outcomes of the model are as follows (they
are derived in the appendix):
p∗=1− b+
√
D
s∗=
1
2
(6)
π∗= 1
2
− 1
2
(b+
√
D).
The variable D captures the autarky eﬀect:
D = {1− b}2 − {1− b(3− 2δ)}2.
Note that for δ = 1 we getD = 0, and (6) reduces to (5), the equilibrium
outcomes for random transaction patterns.
For δ < 1, firms will prefer compatibility if b−
√
D > 0. After some
rearrangement of terms, this condition can be written as:
b >
4(1− δ)
(3− 2δ)2 .
This is the lower curve in figure 1. For values of b below this curve,
duopolists prefer incompatibility. The figure also shows the curve b =
1
2−δ . For values of b above this curve, the DePalma and Leruth (1993)
condition is no longer met, and the system ‘tips’ if firms maintain in-
compatible standards. Note that if δ = 1 and 0 < b < 1, duopolists
always prefer compatibility over incompatibility, in line with the results
of section 3.1. For smaller δ, however, duopolists on either side of a
border increasingly prefer incompatibility.
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Figure 1: Range of values of b and δ where firms prefer (in)compatibility,
transaction patterns are not random but semi-autarkic (δ < 1)
Result 2 For δ < 1 and b < 1, firms on either side of a border
make the following (in)compatibility decision:
1. If b < 4(1−δ)
(3−2δ)2 both firms prefer to maintain incompatible versions.
2. If 4(1−δ)
(3−2δ)2 > b >
1
2−δ the equilibrium is the same as with random
transaction patterns: both firms prefer compatibility.
3. If b > 1
2−δ the DePalma-Leruth condition for coexistence of incom-
patible networks is no longer met.
When b is low compared to δ firms prefer incompatibility, because
the network benefits of compatibility are smaller than the gains from
the decreased competition resulting from incompatible standards across
borders. For intermediate values of b, the network benefits of compat-
ibility dominate and we get the (familiar) result that both firms prefer
compatibility. For high values of b the nature of the ‘game’ changes to
winner takes all, if firms maintain incompatibility; Depending on the risk
profile of either firm, and their estimate of the chances to win this battle,
they may prefer to fight it out rather than establish compatibility.
What causes this sudden desire for incompatibility by firms? The
semi-autarkic transaction pattern creates a natural border. This bor-
der softens competition by insulating both players against each other’s
competition.
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Incompatibility Compatibility Gain
Wf 1− b+
√
D 1 b−
√
D
Wc −(1− b+
√
D) + (1− δ
2
)b −1 + b −(1− δ
2
)b+
√
D
Ws (1− δ2)b b
δ
2
b
Table 2: Welfare eﬀects of compatibility decision
3.3 Welfare analysis
Table 2 summarizes the welfare impact of the compatibility decision.
Firm welfare, Wf , is the sum of firm profits. Consumer welfare, Wc, is
defined as minus the hedonic price, while social welfare, Ws, is simply
Wf +Wc.
It is useful to first consider the polar cases of random transaction
patterns (δ = 1) and total autarky (δ = 0), and then look at the inter-
mediate case.
Random transaction patterns ( δ = 1). In that case D = 0 and the
gain from establishing compatibility is always positive for both firms,
making it the unique equilibrium outcome. Consumers are worse oﬀ
under compatibility, since prices rise by b, while their network benefits
only increase by b
2
. But since firms gain twice as much as consumers lose,
the overall welfare is higher under compatibility. Thus the equilibrium
outcome is also the socially desirable outcome.
Complete autarky ( δ = 0). The compatibility decision does not
impact social welfare. It does however transfer welfare between firms
and consumers. Firms gain from incompatibility if 0 < b < 4
9
. Their
gain, b−
√
D, represents a pure welfare transfer from consumers to firms
(compared to a situation of compatibility). This transfer is 0 for b = 0
and b = 4
9
, reaching a maximum value of 1
2
for b = 1
6
. Hence for very
low δ, firms may have a very large incentive to prefer incompatibility,
leading to an equally large loss for consumers.
Some autarky ( 0 < δ < 1). Incompatibility leads to a welfare loss of
δ
2
b. If firms prefer incompatibility, they do so because it raises their profit.
Hence consumers must face a loss that is bigger than the social welfare
loss (since firms gain from incompatibility). As δ grows (countries are
more connected) so does the loss in social welfare, reaching a maximum
of 1
6
for δ = 3
4
and b = 4
9
.10 The loss to consumers, by contrast, goes
down as δ increases, because this diminishes the dampening eﬀect on
competition.
10This is the maximum welfare loss subject to the constraint that firms indeed
prefer incompatibility, i.e. b < 4(1−δ)(3−2δ) .
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Result 3 When transaction patterns are highly autarkic, incompat-
ibility leads to a substantial loss in consumer welfare and a modest loss
in social welfare. For more integrated patterns (large δ) incompatibility
may lead to substantial losses in both social and consumer welfare.
An important feature of the model is that it assumes fixed demand
and takes firm cost structures as given (both are basic features of the
underlying Hotelling model). This means that the loss in social welfare
is entirely due to the direct impact of incompatibility, which reduces
the network benefits to consumers and society as a whole. Because de-
mand is fixed, the lack of competition does not lead to the ‘deadweight
loss’ associated with a monopoly. And because cost structures are given,
competition does not reduce X-ineﬃciencies. Hence the model underes-
timates the social losses due to incompatibility.
There is empirical evidence that the price sensitivity of the demand
for payment services is indeed low. Using cross-country data, Humphrey,
Pulley, et al. (1996) find own price elasticities of 0.09-0.26; Murphy
(1991) finds that per item charges on checks reduce usage by only 10%;
and several authors have been puzzled by the willingness of consumers
to pay high interest rates on credit card debt.11
The second assumption (cost structures are given) gets much less
empirical support. As discussed earlier, the survey by Berger DeYoung,
et al. (2000) strongly suggests that foreign competition significantly
reduces X-ineﬃciencies. This would imply that the social loss from in-
compatibility is larger than the model suggests.
3.4 Impact of migration costs on harmonization
In some cases compatibility can be established by ‘flipping a switch’, by
opening up a network. In other cases, however, migration involves real
costs, such as educating consumers, issuing new cards, assigning new
(account) numbers etc.
Let c denote the cost of migrating a single user to another version
of the network technology. The earlier analysis implicitly assumed c =
0. If c > 0 this poses an additional hurdle for firms that start with
incompatible standards and want to make them compatible. Either firm
11Humphrey, Kim, et al. (2001) analyze the impact of prices on payment instru-
ment usage in Norway. They find much higher own price elasticities: 0.75 - 0.96.
However, it is not clear that the dramatic substitution of checks by electronic pay-
ments was (solely) due to pricing, since the Netherlands, for example, witnessed a
similarly rapid substitution without the introduction of e.g. a consumer charge per
check.
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Figure 2: Occurrence of excess inertia as a function of autarky and
network benefits, c = 0.1
will migrate if the gain in profits outweighs migration costs:
1
2
c <
1
2
(b−
√
D). (7)
For c = 0.1, the resulting relationship is shown by the solid line in
figure 2.12 Compared to the lower curve in figure 1, migration costs shift
the curve upwards, increasing the area where firms prefer to maintain
incompatible versions. On the other hand, migration costs reduce the
welfare gain of establishing compatibility. The dotted-line curve in figure
2 represents the points where the net eﬀect on social welfare is neutral
because migration costs just oﬀset the welfare gain of compatibility:
c =
δ
2
b
The preference of firms to maintain incompatibility leads to a social loss
only in the area between the two curves. And for δ suﬃciently small,
‘excess inertia’ (firms prefer incompatibility while migration would raise
social welfare) is no longer a social problem.
12After some reshuﬄing expression (7) can be reworked to:
b =
c− 2δ + 2− 2
p
δ2 − δc− 2δ − 2c2 + c+ 1 + 3δc2 − c2δ2
9− 12δ + 4δ2
This relationship is shown in the graph.
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Result 4 Migration costs mitigate the issue of welfare loss, especially
if transaction patterns are highly autarkic (small δ).
Since migration costs represent real costs, they reduce the welfare
loss of maintaining incompatibility. This is especially the case if δ is
very small: the benefits of a common standard are then quite small
relative to the cost of migration. It is therefor not surprising that the
net welfare benefit of migration to a compatible standard is negative if
transaction patterns are highly autarkic. As before, however, this does
not consider reduced X-ineﬃciencies caused by increased competition.
If these are taken into account, welfare gains of compatibility would
increase and the dotted line in figure 2 would shift downwards.
4 Application to European payments
Payments oﬀer an interesting application of the model results. Three
types of instruments were distinguished in table 1: cash, card payments
(including ATM withdrawals), and credit transfers.
While cash was indeed harmonized with the introduction of the Euro,
the instrument is not a commercially sponsored standard (the sponsoring
central banks are not profit focused); therefore the model of the previous
section cannot be applied to cash.
In the case of cards, the purely technical compatibility issues are
minor. All ATMs can accept practically all cards from all countries, and
the same is true for most POS terminals. Yet banks have maintained
largely national card systems. Most countries have national schemes,
such as Bancontact/MisterCash in Belgium and EC Cash in Germany.
While these cards can be used at foreign Point of Sales using the Maestro
function, most merchants only accept the domestic cards. And banks
charged (much) higher fees on cross-border card transactions than on
domestic transactions, until this practice was prohibited by the EU in
2002. Arguably, the current set-up does make it impossible for a Belgian
bank to sign up Dutch customers, unless that bank sets up a Dutch
operation that joins the local processing network, supports the Dutch
protocols, etc.
For international credit transfers, the technical incompatibility issues
run deeper than in cards. Each country has its own account numbering
system, and credit transfer format. And an instrument like direct debit
is subject to very diﬀerent rules in various countries.13
13These rules have to do with things like consumer protection: can an automatic
debit be reversed by the consumer? Up till how many weeks after the transaction?
13
This lack of standardization in credit transfer payments became quite
visible with the introduction of the physical Euro in 2002, which created
a single (cash) payment instrument that could be used throughout 12
EU countries. By that time, the European Commission had been urging
banks to improve the situation for several years, as it considered the
lack of a proper Pan-European payments infrastructure an impediment
to the further integration of Europe. From 1990 to 2000 a series of white
papers and Directives urged banks to take action, all to little avail.14
Increasingly frustrated with this lack of progress, the European Parlia-
ment passed Regulation EC 2560/2001 (European Community, 2001).
This regulation forced banks to maintain the same tariﬀ structure for
domestic and international Euro payments below EUR 12,500, and to
implement a common account numbering system (IBAN).
Reality is of course far more complex than the 2-firmmodel laid out in
the previous section. Nevertheless, it oﬀers some basic insights into the
compatibility and harmonization decision for semi-autarkic networks.
As shown in the introduction, payments networks exhibit precisely such
transaction patterns.
Let f denote cross-border transactions as a share of all transactions.
As summarized in table 1, f cards ≈ 5% and f transfers ≈ 0.5%.15 These
quantities give an indication of the value of the parameter δ. The
duopoly model of the previous section put the share of foreign trans-
actions at f = δ
2
. In a more general setting, with N countries with
shares si, i = 1..N , the share of foreign transactions, denoted fi, is equal
to:
fi = δ(1− si).
Summing across all countries we get:
f =
NX
i=1
sifi = δ(1−H)
where f is the overall share of cross-border transactions and H =
P
s2i
is the Herfindahl index. If we approximate the si for European countries
14For an overview, see European Commission (2000).
15Estimate of f transfers is based on data from BIS (2004) and ECB (2003). Cross-
border transfers are estimated from number of swift category-1 messages. The total
number of transfer transactions was based on the sum of direct debits, domestic
transfer payments, half of all checks (assuming the other half was written at the
POS) and cross-border transfers. Estimate of δcards based on data from Visa and
MasterCard.
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by their population share, we get H = 0.14, and
δtransfers= f
transfers
1−H ≈
0.5%
0.86
≈ 0.6%
δcards= f
cards
1−H ≈
5%
0.86
≈ 6%
Obtaining an estimate for b is trickier, because b is expressed as a multi-
ple of t, the transportation costs in the Hotelling model, which is clearly
an unobserved variable. We can conclude however, that the low values
of δ put us clearly on the far left of figures 1 and 2. Finally, one could
assume that for cards the costs of moving to a technically compatible
system is small: c ≈ 0, while in credit transfer payments c could be
substantial.
Overall, the current landscape in both instruments is in line with
Results 1 and 2: perfect compatibility within countries, and much more
limited compatibility across countries. Given the low δ, one could argue
that for cards the overall welfare loss due to this cross-border incom-
patibility is limited, while it increases bank profits at the expense of
consumers. As said, per customer migration costs might be significant
for credit transfer payment systems. According to Result 4, this would
further decrease any welfare loss, especially since δtransfers is very low
indeed. The welfare transfer eﬀect, however, could be quite relevant.
Finally, one expects the reluctance of banks to establish compatibility
to be much larger for credit transfers than for cards: they would have
to bear any migration costs, while the positive eﬀect of incompatibility
on profits is larger than for cards, because δtransfers is much lower than
δcards.
The EC Regulation indeed achieves a wealth transfer (back) from
banks to consumers, by forcing lower rates on cross-border credit and
debit card and credit transfer payments. But it has not (yet) led to
fully compatible systems, especially in credit transfer payments. Banks
responded to the EC Regulation by agreeing to establish at least one
(EBA step2), and possibly more, Pan European Automated Clearing
Houses (PEACHs). However, these were primarily envisioned as a so-
lution for cross-border payments, acting as an overlay for the domestic
systems. While eventually some domestic volumes might migrate to this
PEACH, this was not foreseen for the short or even medium term.16
Given the substantial costs of migrating all domestic systems to a com-
mon infrastructure, account numbering system etc., this decision makes
perfect sense from the point of views of banks. And it is in line with
16EBF (2002).
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the dynamics of the model of section 3. However, it also means that
national payment systems will continue to be one of the (many) barriers
to European banking integration.
5 Discussion of results
This paper analyzes the compatibility decision for network products with
sponsored standards in the presence of (somewhat) autarkic transaction
patterns. A simple 2-firm model showed that transaction patterns can
be very relevant for the compatibility decision. National transaction
patterns may lead firms to prefer compatibility within, and incompat-
ibility across countries. The basic reason for this is that incompatible
networks act as a barrier between countries, giving firms a certain degree
of monopoly power in their home country.
For the sake of simplicity, the model focusses on transaction pat-
terns at the expense of other aspects. Importantly, it uses the Hotelling
framework which assumes fixed demand and takes firm costs as given.
As discussed, the former assumption may be reasonable in the case of
payments, but the latter is more dubious. The benefits of migrating to
a common standard may therefor be substantial, even if direct welfare
gain is limited due to the low number of cross-border transactions and
likely migration costs. There may thus be a clear divergence between
the interests of banks and a social planner. This is a fortiori the case if
the benefits of increased trade in European goods and services (due to
cheaper/simpler cross-border payments) are considered.
Several areas remain to be further explored. On the empirical side,
it would be fascinating to analyze transaction patterns within countries,
for example between individual USA states or German Länder. Is there
comparable autarky at this level? On the theoretical side, the model
could be expanded to deal with multiple firms within a country that
compete against each other, as well as against firms in the other country.
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Appendix: Model outcomes for δ< 1
To find equilibrium outcomes for the model with autarkic transaction
patterns, this appendix first derive market share functions, then uses
these to calculate response functions and equilibrium prices and profits.
1. Market share functions. If δ < 1, the market share functions are
no longer continuous, if firms have incompatible standards. To see that,
take the perspective of firm 2, as it tries to expand market share beyond
s2 =
1
2
. Attracting the nearest customer in the other ‘country’ requires
a discontinuous lowering of price, since the network benefits for that
customer are limited: he interacts mostly with customers of country 1,
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who use the incompatible network of firm 1. The network benefits of the
‘last’ customer in country 2 are equal to:µ
1− δ
2
¶
b. (8)
since he performs a fraction δ
2
with ‘foreign’ customers and thus a fraction¡
1− δ
2
¢
with domestic customers, and only domestic customers use his
network. The network benefits of the first ‘foreign’ customer of firm 2
(located in country 1) are equal to:
δ
2
b. (9)
since this customer can only use the network of firm 2 for his foreign
transactions. Thus, to attract the first foreign customer, the price needs
to drop by the diﬀerence between (8) and (9) or:µ
1− δ
2
¶
b− δ
2
b = (1− δ)b.
Hence all prices that satisfy |p1 − p2| ≤ (1− δ)b will lead to s1 = s2 = 12
(note that if δ = 1, the required drop is 0, and the function is continu-
ous). Assume p2 < p1 − (1 − δ)b. In that case the marginal customer,
with address s1, will reside in country 1. By definition the address of this
marginal customer is s1. Of all his transactions, a share
¡
1− δ
2
¢
is with
customers in country 1. Of these, a fraction 2s1 are using the network of
firm 1. Hence a share of his transactions equal to
¡
1− δ
2
¢
2s1 = (2−δ)s1
is with customers on network 1 and 1− (2− δ)s1 is with customers on
network 2. Now for this marginal customer the benefits of both networks
need to be the same:
p1 + ts1 − b(2− δ)s1 = p2 + t(1− s1)− b [1− (2− δ) s1] .
Normalizing t = 1 and solving for s1:
2s1 − 2b (2− δ) s1= p2 − p1 + 1− b⇔
s1=
p2 − p1 + 1− b
2− 2b(2− δ) . (10)
Using a similar approach for the case where the marginal customer is in
country 2, we get the following share function for s1 (and s2 = 1− s1):
if |p1 − p2| ≤ (1− δ)b: s1 = 1
2
(11)
if p1 − p2 > (1− δ)b: s1 =
p2 − p1 + 1− b
2− 2b(2− δ)
if p2 − p1 > (1− δ)b: s1 =
p2 − p1 + 1− b(3− 2δ)
2− 2b(2− δ) .
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2. Equilibrium prices and profits. We now get a situation where a
firm can only expand its market share above 1
2
if it substantially drops its
price, ‘undercutting’ its rival. To analyze this type of situation I use the
concept of Undercut Proof Equilibrium (UPE), described in Shy (2002).
It defines equilibrium as a situation where neither firm can profitably
undercut its rival’s price. Let π∗i , p∗i and s∗i denote UPE profits, prices
and shares. Because of the symmetry s∗1 = s
∗
2 =
1
2
. Suppose firm 2 tries
to undercut its rival, who is charging p∗1, by oﬀering a price p2. We can
now maximize firm 2 profits: π2 = (p2 − c)s2. The first order condition
is:
∂π2
∂p2
= s2 + (p2 − c)s
0
2 = 0⇔
p∗1 − p2 + 1− b(3− 2δ)= p2 − c⇔
p2=
p∗1 + 1− b(3− 2δ) + c
2
.
If firm 2 indeed selects this price p2 we get:
s2=
p∗1 − p2 + 1− b(3− 2δ)
2− 2b(2− δ) =
p∗1+1−b(3−2δ)−c
2
2− 2b(2− δ)
π2=(p2 − c)s2 =
h
p∗1+1−b(3−2δ)−c
2
i2
2− 2b(2− δ) .
If firm 2 were to charge p∗2 = p
∗
1 (instead of undercutting firm 1), its
profit would be (p∗1−c)12 . So a price p∗1 is undercut proof if firm 2 cannot
get a higher profit by deviating form p2 = p∗1:
(p∗1 − c)
2
≥π2
(p∗1 − c)
2
≥
h
p∗1+1−b(3−2δ)−c
2
i2
2− 2b(2− δ)
We can directly substitute π∗1 = (p∗1 − c)12 to obtain:
[2− 2b(2− δ)]π∗1≥
·
π∗1 +
1− b(3− 2δ)
2
¸2
⇔
0≥ (π∗1)2 − (1− b)π∗1 +
·
1− b(3− 2δ)
2
¸2
.
π∗1 is the highest value that satisfies this quadratic inequality. Hence:
π∗1=
1− b+
√
D
2
with
D=(1− b)2 − [1− b(3− 2δ)]2.
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Because of symmetry, π∗1 = π∗2. Note that if δ = 1 (the case analyzed
in section 3) we get D = 0 and π∗i = 12 −
b
2
, which is exactly the result
obtained in section 3 (table 1). Hence the concept of UPE converges to
the standard Hotelling Nash-equilibrium as δ → 1 (as it should).
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